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NOTES
"MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE HIGHEST
RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUST:"* AN ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY IN
PARRAVANO v. BABBITT
Anne-Marie Lombardi**
I. INTRODUCrION
In Parravano v. Babbitt,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed commercial fishers' allegation that the Secretaries
of Commerce and Interior violated the Magnuson Act2 by improperly
reducing the ocean harvest rate of Klamath chinook salmon. The court
ruled that the Secretaries properly reduced the ocean harvest in light of
threats to Native American fishing rights. The case raised several signifi-
cant issues, including the federal government's responsibility to protect
tribal resources? This note analyzes the court's interpretation of the fed-
eral trust responsibility in Parravano and examines whether the Secretar-
ies' actions set an example for fisheries management that fulfills the
federal government's trust responsibility to Native American tribes.
Part II of this note provides a brief explanation of the Magnuson Act,
the applicable statute in Parravano. Part II also outlines the history of the
Parravano district court cases and explains the evolution of the federal
trust relationship as it pertains to tribal rights. Part III examines the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Parravano, focusing on the nature of federally re-
served tribal fishing rights and the federal government's responsibility to
protect these rights. Finally, Part IV concludes that the federal trust rela-
tionship is as an important legal tool for tribes to enforce federally re-
* Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (Murphy, J. for the majority).
** J.D. expected 1998, School of Law, University of Montana; M.A., 1994, University of
Montana; B.S., 1990, Villanova University.
i. Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996).
2. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994).
3. See Parravano, 70 F.3d at 547 ("We have noted, with great frequency, that the federal
government is the trustee of Indian tribes' rights, including fishing rights.").
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served rights, and serves as a guiding principle by which federal officials
may manage natural resources in a way that respects tribal interests.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Magnuson Act
In 1976, Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act,4 or Magnuson Act,' as a response to overfishing and insufficient
fishery conservation in coastal waters.6 The Magnuson Act established
regional councils that develop fishery management plans which are sub-
mitted to the United States Secretary of Commerce.7 The Secretary re-
views the plans for compliance with the Act's seven "national standards"
and "any other applicable law."8 The Magnuson Act authorizes the Secre-
tary to approve or disapprove the councils' plans9 and to issue emergen-
cy regulations that alter a regional council's plan if fisheries are jeop-
ardized."° The Magnuson Act's requirement that the plan comply with
"any other applicable law" has been judicially interpreted to include the
United States' legal obligations to Native American tribes with regard to
fishing rights."
4. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994)).
5. Originally named the Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the act was renamed the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in honor of its original sponsor, the late Wash-
ington Senator, Warren Magnuson. Catherine E. Decker, Issues in the Reauthorization of the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 1 OcEAN & COASTAL L. J. 323 n.1 (1995)
(citing Pub. L. No. 96-561, § 238, 94 Stat. 3300 (1980) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1801)). The act is
commonly referred to as the Magnuson Act.
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1),(2).
7. § l852(a),(h)(1).
8. § 1854(a)(1)(B).
9. § 1854(a)(1)(A).
10. § 1855(c).
11. Parravano v. Babbitt, 837 F. Supp. 1034, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Courts have interpreted
the provision "any other applicable law" as including treaties made between the United States govern-
ment and Indian tribes. See, e.g., Hoh Indian Tribe v. Baldrige, 522 F. Supp. 683, 685 (W.D. Wash.
1981) ("The [Magnuson Act] requires that any fishery management plan must contain the conservation
and management measures which are consistent with the national standards set forth in... the
[Magnuson Act], and any other applicable law[,] including applicable treaties with Indian tribes."). In
Washington State Charterboat Ass'n v. Baldrige, the court stated, "the Magnuson Act expressly pro-
vides that each fishery management plan approved by the Secretary shall be consistent with all provi-
sions of the Act and 'any other applicable law.' Such 'other law' includes the Stevens treaties."'
702 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cit. 1983). The Stevens treaties are those treaties negotiated by Issac Stevens,
Washington's Territorial Governor, with the Pacific Northwest tribes in 1854-1855. See FELix S. CO-
HEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 450 (1982 ed.).
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B. Fisheries Conservation Measures on the Klamath River
The Klamath River chinook salmon are anadromous fish" that
spawn in the upper reaches and tributaries of the Klamath River.3 The
Klamath River runs across the northwestern comer of California, and
through the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Indian Reservations 4 before it
empties into the Pacific Ocean. 5 Excessive water diversions, overfishing,
and habitat degradation have required that the Klamath salmon harvest be
severely curtailed, leading to conflicts among those with competing inter-
ests in the fishery: commercial fishers, sport fishers and the Hoopa Valley
and Yurok Tribes (Tribes).'6 Two government entities have jurisdiction
over the fisheries resources: the United States Department of Interior has
authority to set harvest levels for Klamath salmon on the Hoopa Valley
and Yurok Reservations; 7 the U.S. Department of Commerce, working
with the Pacific Fishery Management Council, has authority to set ocean
harvest levels within the Exclusive Economic Zone, two to three hundred
nautical miles offshore. 8
From 1990 through 1992, the Pacific Fishery Management Council
set escapement 9 and ocean harvest levels far below the minimum levels
necessary to preserve the Klamath salmon fishery. Recommended es-
12. Anadromous fish are those that hatch in rivers and migrate to the ocean, where they live
before returning to the rivers of their origin to reproduce. Parravano v. Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914, 924
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
13. Parravano, 70 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1995).
14. The Yurok Tribe originally occupied the Klamath River Reservation, located along the
lower 20 miles of the Klamath River. Parravano, 861 F. Supp. at 919. The Klamath River Reservation
was established by an executive order issued by President Pierce in 1855. The Hoopa Valley Reserva-
tion, established in 1876 by President Grant's executive order, was located on both sides of the Trinity
River and was occupied primarily by Hoopa Indians. In 1891, President Harrison issued an executive
order that extended the Hoopa Valley Reservation to encompass the Klamath River Reservation, there-
by joining the two reservations. In 1988, Congress enacted the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, which
partitioned the extended Hoopa Valley Reservation into two separate reservations: the Hoopa Valley
and Yurok Reservations. The legislative history that accompanied the partition act indicates that tribal
fishing rights were a recognized asset to be held in trust by the United States for both the Hoopa Val-
ley and Yurok Tribes. Id. at 919-20.
15. United States v. Wlson, 611 F. Supp. 813, 815 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
16. Parravano, 861 F. Supp. at 917.
17. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at 1040 (citing Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n, Inc.
v. Secretary of Commerce, 494 F. Supp. 626, 633 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1980)).
18. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at 1040. The coastal states have jurisdiction between the coast and
three nautical miles offshore. The "exclusive economic zone" begins at the outer limits of the state
territorial waters and extends to 200-300 nautical miles offshore. Id.
19. Spawning escapement refers to the number of fish that are allowed to escape ocean and
river harvest so that they can return to their places of origin to reproduce. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at
1041 n.6.
20. Id. at 1042. In 1984, the Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended, and the Com-
merce Secretary adopted, the "Final Framework Plan," a multi-year management plan for ocean salm-
on fisheries. The minimum standards for escapement were set forth in Amendment Nine of the Final
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capement was set at 35% of harvestable fish, with a minimum escapement
of 35,000 naturally spawning adults in any one year.2 The Council's
repeated failure to meet the minimum standards forced the Interior Depart-
ment to critically reduce salmon harvesting on the Hoopa Valley and
Yurok Reservations to conserve the species.2
In 1993, the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce met to coordinate
regulation of the Klamath salmon harvest, seeking a more equitable har-
vest distribution between the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes and the
ocean fishers.' That same year, the Pacific Fishery Management Council
submitted a management plan that provided for a 35,000 escapement level,
a 22% ocean harvest rate and a 32.5% in-river harvest for the Hoopa
Valley Reservation.24 Commerce Secretary Brown rejected that plan be-
cause it would compromise either conservation measures or the Tribes'
fishing rights.' Instead, he issued an emergency regulation and alternate
management plan that raised the escapement level to 38,000 and reduced
ocean harvest to 14.5%, allowing the Tribes 44.6% of the total annual
salmon harvest.'
After Secretary Brown issued the emergency regulation, commercial
fishers and fishing associations (Parravano), brought an action against the
Secretary alleging that he violated the Magnuson Act by not complying
with the Act's National Standards and improperly issuing the emergency
regulation. 7 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California ruled in favor of the Commerce Secretary.' Judge Thelton E.
Henderson, writing for the court, held that the Secretary could rationally
conclude that the Pacific Fishery Management Council's recommenda-
tions were inconsistent with the Secretary's obligation to prevent
overfishing; therefore, the Secretary had not acted arbitrarily or capricious-
ly in rejecting the Council's recommendations.29 In fact, the court found
Framework Plan. Id. at 1041 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 661 app. at IV.A (1992)). The "escapement floor" is
the minimum number of salmon that must escape harvest and reproduce in order to prevent the long-
term decline of the species. Id. The escapement levels fell below one-third of the minimum escape-
ment level of 35,000 from 1990-1992: escapement was 15,500 in 1990, 11,500 in 1991 and 11,100 in
1992. Id. at 1042 & n.9.
21. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at 1041.
22. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 543.
23. Id. Secretary Babbitt asserted that the Tribes were entitled to 50% of the total annual
Klamath salmon harvest and to meet this goal, ocean fishing would need to be curtailed so that a
sufficient number of fish could reach the Klamath River for harvest and spawning. Id.
24. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at 1043.
25. Id. The 35,000 escapement and 22% ocean harvest rate did not provide for the levels neces-
sary to reserve 50% of the harvest for the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes' Klamath River fisheries.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1039.
28. Id. at 1048.
29. Id. at 1044. Under the Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b), the Commerce Secretary's
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that in attempting to achieve an optimum yield from the fishery, the Sec-
retary was "required to consider the requirements of the Indian in-river
fishery" and "entitled to reject the Council's... recommendations be-
cause [they failed] to compensate for sufficient in-river Indian harvest."'3
In 1994, the Parravano plaintiffs brought another action in the dis-
trict court. They claimed that no federal law reserves fishing" rights to the
Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes which the Commerce Secretary must
consider "applicable law" within the meaning of the Magnuson Act."
Judge Henderson again found for the Commerce Secretary, holding that:
(1) the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes have a federally reserved fishing
right;32 (2) fishing rights created by statute or executive order have equal
weight with those created by treaty;33 and (3) it was appropriate for the
Commerce Secretary to regulate the ocean harvest of Klamath salmon to
provide a sufficient harvest for the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Reservation
fisheries.'
Most importantly, the district court acknowledged the federal govern-
ment's role in protecting tribes' federally reserved rights from infringe-
ment by competing interests. The court further acknowledged that such
protection requires coordinated management by federal agencies with
jurisdiction over resources in which the tribes have a federally reserved
interest,36 or with authority over actions that might adversely affect those
resources.37 The district court's comprehensive record implicitly referred
to the federal government's trust responsibility to the Hoopa Valley and
decision is judicially reviewable, but will be overturned only ff the court finds the Secretary acted in a
manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." Id. at 1041-42 (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982)).
30. Parravano, 837 F. Supp. at 1046.
31. Parravano, 861 F. Supp. at 918.
32. Id. at 922-23.
33. Id. at 923.
34. Id. at 924-25.
35. Id. at 925. As the district court noted, "the Government has 'recognized the vital impor-
tance of the fisheries to the Indians and wanted to protect them from the risk that non-Indian settlers
might seek to monopolize their fisheries."' Id. (quoting Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 666 (1979)). The court added: " he Court is also
mindful that '[t]he United States, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, has charged itself with
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust [towards reservation Indians].' Id. (quoting
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972)).
36. Parravano, 861 F. Supp. at 925 ("Mhe Secretary of Commerce must manage the ocean
fishery in a manner consistent 'with any other applicable law,' 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(B), which ...
we construe as including United States [sic] obligations to Indian reservations with respect to fishing
rights ... [and] requir[ing] that any optimum yield [set by the Commerce Secretary] must take into
account the Indian Fishery on the Klamath River.").
37. Id. at 924 ("[F]or the Tribes' federally reserved fishing right to have any practical meaning,
it must include regulation of activities occurring outside the reservation which negatively impact that
right").
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Yurok Tribes, an important point of discussion in the later Ninth Circuit
decision. The trust responsibility, as recognized by Judge Henderson and
later by the appeals court, has developed into a significant legal tool for
tribes seeking to enforce federally reserved rights.
C. Federal Trust Responsibility Toward Native American Tribes
The federal trust responsibility toward Native American tribes
evolved judicially, beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's decisions in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia." In Cherokee
Nation, the Cherokee Tribe filed an action against the United States to
enjoin the enforcement of Georgia state laws on tribal lands.39 The Court
believed that it lacked original jurisdiction because the Tribe was neither a
state nor a foreign nation.' Justice Marshall characterized Native Ameri-
can tribes' status as "domestic dependent nations" with a "relation to the
United States government [which] resembles that of a ward to his guard-
ian."'" In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall further elaborated upon
the guardian-ward relationship.42 The trust principles articulated by Jus-
tice Marshall have been applied throughout the twentieth century to estab-
lish and protect the rights of Native American tribes, making the trust
relationship "one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law."
Federal courts have interpreted this trust relationship to protect tribal
rights, construing ambiguous treaty language in favor of the tribes."
Courts have extended important protections, such as reserved water rights
38. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 220; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
39. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1.
40. Id. at 16. The United States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends only to cases
"affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party." U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. The Court's appellate jurisdiction includes "Controversies
between two or more States ... [or] between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
41. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
42. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552 ("[The United States] receive the Chero-
kee nation into their favour and protection. The Cherokees acknowledge themselves to be under the
protection of the United States, and of no other power.").
43. COHEN, supra note 11, at 220-21.
44. Id. at 222. For example, in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the United States
brought suit on behalf of the Yaldma Nation to enjoin the respondents, non-Indian fishers and land-
owners, from obstructing the Yakimas' off-reservation fishing rights. Through an 1859 treaty with the
United States, the Yakimas acquired exclusive fishing rights within the reservation boundaries and off-
reservation rights at "usual and accustomed" places. Id. at 378. Respondents contended that the treaty
provided no special off-reservation fishing rights. Id. at 379. The Supreme Court held that the treaty
secured off-reservation fishing rights that permitted the Yakimas to cross privately-owned lands to ac-
cess their traditional fishing places. Id. at 381-82. The Court declared that Indian treaties would be
construed "as [the Indians] understood [them] and 'as justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection."' Id. at 380.
1997] PARRAVANO v. BABBITT 219
or rights to hunt and fish, based upon treaties and other agreements that
created Indian reservations.4 The courts' protective approach acknowl-
edges the unequal bargaining position and communication difficulties
between the federal government and the tribes when creating treaties.'
The courts have refused to permit abrogation or modification of these
reserved rights without express congressional intent.47
The federal trust responsibility imposes strict fiduciary standards upon
all federal agencies that interact with tribes and requires federal officials to
administer regulations and statutes so as to protect tribal rights." Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton49 illustrates the application of trust princi-
ples to federal agency conduct. In Pyramid Lake, the federal district court
struck down a regulation which allowed for certain water diversions that
adversely affected Pyramid Lake, located downstream on the Pyramid
Lake Indian Reservation."0 The court stated that the United States, "acting
through the Secretary of Interior, 'has charged itself with moral obliga-
tions of the highest responsibility and trust... [and its] conduct...
should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards."''
The court ruled that the Interior Secretary had an affirmative duty to pro-
tect the Paiute Tribe's water rights to the fullest extent possible within his
authority.52
The federal trust responsibility assumes special significance in con-
flicts between tribal and non-tribal interests over natural resources man-
aged by federal agencies. 53 The federal courts continue to decide impor-
45. COHN, supra note 11, at 221-22.
46. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 330-31, 355-56 (W.D. Wash. 1974)
(explaining the history and process of treaty-making in Washington Territory and the difficulties in
translation between the United States' negotiators and the tribes).
47. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). The Court in
Menominee considered whether the Menominees' fishing and hunting rights were extinguished by the
Termination Act of 1954. The Court held that the Tribe's fishing and hunting rights were preserved
because the Court found no explicit congressional intent to abrogate the Tribe's rights. The Court
stated that although Congress has the power to abrogate Indian hunting and fishing rights, an intention
to abrogate such rights would not be "lightiy imputed." Id at 413. See also United States v. Dion, 476
U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (finding clear congressional intent that the Eagle Protection Act abrogated Indian
treaty rights to hunt bald eagles based on the acts's provision allowing "take" permits for tribal reli-
gious purposes, and based on the legislative history of the act); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp.
1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) abrogated Indian treaty
rights to hunt the endangered Florida panther based on precedent which held that treaty rights do not
extend to the "point of extinction," and on the ESA's legislative history and express exceptions for
Alaskan Natives).
48. CoHEN, supra note 1I, at 227.
49. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 256 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942)).
52. Id.
53. Opposing parties' interests may be governed by separate federal agencies, which may fur-
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tant cases in which tribal interests clash with non-tribal interests.'
Parravano v. Babbitt is one of the more recent cases in which the courts
rely upon the trust responsibility as a source of authority for upholding
tribal fishing rights against non-tribal commercial interests.
H. PARRAVANO V. BABBITt
In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
district court decisions in Parravano v. Babbitt."5 On appeal, Parravano
contended that the Commerce Secretary, in issuing the emergency regula-
tion, erroneously considered fishing rights reserved to the Hoopa Valley
and Yurok Tribes. 6 Parravano argued that the Tribes do not possess fed-
erally reserved fishing rights because their rights arise from executive or-
ders, not treaties. 7 Parravano also argued that the Tribes do not possess
federally reserved rights that constitute "any other applicable law" under
the Magnuson Act, and that the Commerce Secretary should not consider
the Tribes' rights in the administration of the Magnuson Act.5
The Ninth Circuit Court disagreed and held that the Secretary of
Commerce properly issued the emergency regulation.59 The Ninth Circuit
opinion examines two primary issues: first, the nature of federally reserved
tribal fishing rights and second, the federal government's responsibility to
protect reserved tribal fishing rights.
A. The Nature of Federally Reserved Fishing Rights
The Ninth Circuit rejected Parravano's argument that the Hoopa
Valley and Yurok Tribes possess no federally reserved fishing rights that
constitute "other applicable law" within the meaning of the Magnuson
Act." Parravano attempted to distinguish between tribal fishing rights
ther complicate and seriously undermine federal agencies' trust responsibility to Native American
tribes. See COHEN, supra note 11, at 227-28.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service arrested
tribal member for killing bald eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act and Eagle Protection
Act; the Court held that the EPA abrogated Indian treaty rights to hunting, but did not reach the issue
of whether ESA did the same); United States v. Wilson, 611 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (holding
that Interior Department's moratorium on commercial fishing on the Klamath River, intended for
conservation purposes, impermissibly abrogated Indian tribal rights to hunt and fish on the Hoopa
Valley Reservation).
55. 70 F.3d 539 (1995) (reviewing Parravano v. Babbitt, 837 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
and 861 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
56. 70 F.3d at 544.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 547.
60. Id. at544.
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arising from executive orders and those arising from treaties." The court
rejected that distinction on three principles. First, the court found that "a
treaty/executive order distinction has no historical or legal significance
with respect to the Tribes involved in [this case]." 2 Second, the court
noted that courts have consistently rejected distinctions between tribal
rights created by treaty and those created by executive orders because such
distinctions ignore the purpose of setting aside reservations "for Indian
purposes.' " Finally, the court found that a treaty/executive order distinc-
tion "is inconsistent with the well-established federal trust obligation owed
to the Indian tribes."
The court discussed the second and third principles at length, explain-
ing federal judicial policy regarding tribal rights. The court noted that
historically, courts have found no significant, qualitative distinction be-
tween tribal rights created through treaty, executive order, or statute.s
The court correctly reasoned that all are federally created rights and merit
protection against non-federal interests.' The court pointed out that when
the federal government set aside reservations "for Indian purposes," hunt-
ing and fishing rights were impliedly included in those Indian purposes.67
The creation of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, by executive orders in
1876 and 1891, recognized hunting and fishing rights, including traditional
salmon fishing." The court found that the Tribes could not be dispos-
sessed of these rights without express congressional intent.' Finding no
such express intent, the court held that the Hoopa Valley and Yurok
Tribes possess federally protected fishing and hunting rights, reserved to
them through the creation of the Hoopa Valley Reservation. 0
61. Id.
62. Id. The court explained. "We have long held that when it comes to protecting tribal rights
against non-federal interests, it makes no difference whether those rights derive from treaty, statute, or
executive order, unless Congress has provided otherwise .... With respect to the Hoopa Valley and
Yurok Tribes, the California courts concluded nearly two decades ago that, as against non-federal in-
terests, tribal rights derived from executive order are treated the same as treaty rights." I. at 545
(citations omitted). The court further explained that the process of creating reservations by treaty ended
in 1871, after which reservations were created by statute, or until 1919, by executive order. Id. Re-
gardless of the source of authority for creating reservations, the federal courts have understood that
"hunting and fishing rights arise by implication when a reservation is set aside for Indian purposes."
Id. at 545-46.
63. See id. at 544-46.
64. Id. at 544.
65. Id. at 545.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 545-46.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 546.
70. Id. See supra note 14 (explaining the creation and subsequent partition of the Hoopa Valley
Reservation). The Ninth Circuit Court noted that the 1988 Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act, which parti-
tioned the Reservation into the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Reservations, did not explicitly reserve fish-
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B. The Federal Government's Trust Responsibility
to Protect Tribal Rights
After holding that the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes possess feder-
ally reserved fishing rights, the court explained the federal government's
responsibility to enforce these rights. This responsibility, the court said,
"extends not just to the Interior Department, but attaches to the federal
government as a whole."'" The court attributed this viewpoint to Judge
Beezer, whose concurring opinion in United States v. Eberhardt'
charged the entire federal government with a trust responsibility toward
Native American tribes.73
In Eberhardt, members of the Yurok Tribe were charged with illegal-
ly catching and selling anadromous fish, in opposition to a moratorium
banning commercial fishing on the Hoopa Valley Reservation.74 The
court in Eberhardt held that the Interior Department had authority to regu-
late the reservation fisheries consistent with its trust duty to preserve and
protect tribal resources.75 In a concurring opinion, Judge Beezer criticized
the "disjoined management" of the Klamath River fishery, noting that the
Commerce Department and Interior Department separately managed the
fishery "with an apparent lack of any coordination."76 Judge Beezer con-
cluded that adequate conservation necessitated coordinated regulation of
harvests throughout the Klamath salmon's migration.77 Judge Beezer
noted that the Commerce Department's failure to enforce adequate con-
servation measures in coastal waters forced the Interior Department to
impose the conservation burden disproportionately on the upstream Hoopa
Valley and Yurok Tribes.78 Judge Beezer accused both the Interior and
Commerce Departments of failing to fulfill their federal trust responsibili-
ties to the Tribes through the mismanagement of the Klamath River fisher-
ing rights. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546. But the court also noted that Congress "recognized the impor-
tance of the Tribes' rights to fish along the Klamath River" and was "aware that each Tribes' inter-
ests in their salmon fisheries was one of its principal assets." Id. Faced with the ambiguities of this
legislative history, the court construed the act in favor of the Tribes, finding no congressional intent to
dispossess the Tribes of their rights. Id.
71. Id.
72. United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., concurring).
73. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546.
74. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d at 1356. For conservation purposes, the State of California had prohib-
ited commercial fishing on the Klamath River since 1933. Id. In 1979, the United States Department
of Interior banned all commercial fishing and sales of anadromous fish taken by Indians on the Hoopa
Valley Reservation. Id. at 1357 (citing moratorium regulation at 25 C.F.R. § 250.8(e) (1985)).
75. Id. at 1359-60.
76. Id. at 1363 (Beezer, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. As an example of the unfair conservation burden placed on the reservation Indians,
Judge Beezer noted that between 1976 and 1984, 67% of the captured fish were harvested by commer-
cial fisheries and only 8% by Indian gill net fishers. Id. at 1363 n.1.
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ies and concluded that "[clooperation among all agencies of the govern-
ment is essential to preserve those Indian fishing rights to the greatest
extent possible."'79
C. The Effect of the Parravano Decision
Nearly a decade after the Eberhardt decision, Parravano indicates
that the Interior and Commerce Departments have finally achieved the
kind of coordinated management advocated by Judge Beezer. This coordi-
nated management of the Klamath fisheries by Interior and Commerce
acknowledges the migratory nature of the Klamath salmon and the harvest
limits necessary to preserve the Tribal fisheries. Because ocean over-har-
vesting significantly decreases the number of salmon that survive to
spawn, a greatly reduced number of Klamath salmon are available for the
upstream Tribes' harvest." In the past, the Interior Department respond-
ed to the crisis of species deterioration by restricting tribal fishing, un-
fairly imposing the conservation burden on the Tribes."1
Moreover, when the Departments of Commerce and Interior failed to
coordinate the ocean and upstream harvests and equally parse the conser-
vation responsibilities, the long-term survival of the Tribal fisheries was
jeopardized.' The Interior Department has a well-established duty to pre-
serve and protect tribal resources as part of its federal trust responsibili-
ty." As Judge Beezer noted, the Interior Department cannot accomplish
this goal in a vacuum; fulfilling this responsibility requires the cooperation
of other federal agencies, namely Commerce, which concurrently adminis-
ters the same resources."
Parravano is consistent with Indian law decisions of the Ninth Cir-
cuit honoring reserved tribal hunting and fishing rights and upholding the
federal government's trust responsibility to ensure protection of these
rights. In Parravano, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the federal
government fulfills its trust responsibility only through a unified effort
among its agencies to protect tribal interests. The court reaffirmed that the
federal trust responsibility attaches to the whole federal government, not
only to certain individual agencies."
The Parravano decision also follows well-established principles of
judicial review of administrative decisions and as such, offers a fairly
79. lId at 1363-64.
80. See supra note 12 (describing the biological cycle of anadromous fish).
81. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 547.
82. See id.
83. United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d at 1360-61.
84. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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predictable result. The judicial standard for invalidating the Secretary of
Commerce's action required that the action be found "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' s
The court found no such basis for invalidating the Commerce Secretary's
action and ruled that Secretary Brown's actions fit within "any other
applicable law," specifically, his trust responsibility to the Hoopa Valley
and Yurok Tribes. This is a distinguishing feature of Parravano: although
the Commerce Secretary's powers to regulate salmon harvest under the
Magnuson Act have been challenged numerous times, courts have not
previously invoked the federal government's trust responsibility to Native
American tribes as a basis for upholding the Secretary's actions.87
Parravano presented unusual circumstances in which the Secretaries
of Interior and Commerce jointly managed the annual harvest of the
Klamath salmon. Prior to 1993, the Commerce Secretary regulated ocean
harvest of the Klamath salmon without seriously considering the upstream
Tribes whose harvest is determined by ocean harvest and escapement
levels. In 1993, when Commerce Secretary Brown rejected the Pacific
Fishery Management Council's plan because it failed to provide adequate-
ly for the upstream tribal harvest, the critical need for coordinated man-
agement was finally realized.88 Moreover, through Interior Secretary Bab-
bitt's advocacy, the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes' allocated share of
the annual harvest approached fifty percent, 9 a more equitable harvest
share than the Tribes received in the past. The actions of Commerce Sec-
retary Brown and Interior Secretary Babbitt demonstrated a commitment to
tribal interests and fulfilled each department's federal trust responsibility
to the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes.
The Parravano decision creates precedent for future management of
fisheries that recognizes and promotes tribal interests. The principle upon
which Secretary Brown and Secretary Babbitt based their actions was the
federal trust responsibility owed to Native American tribes. The trust
responsibility has a long and dynamic history in federal government-tribal
relations and will likely continue to operate as a principle that limits feder-
al actions to prevent harm to tribal interests. However, commentators have
86. Id. at 543.
87. See, e.g., Washington Crab Producers, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that neither the Magnuson Act nor its amendments require the Commerce Secretary to
make an accounting of harvest allocation between treaty Indian and non-Indians before issuing the
1988 harvest plan); Washington State Charterboat Ass'n v. Baldrige, 702 F.2d 820, 823-24 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that Magnuson Act did not abrogate treaty fishing rights under the Stevens treaties, and
that the Stevens treaties precluded the Secretary from adopting an aggregate approach for salmon
harvest allocation).
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pointed to the trust principle as something more than a mechanism to
restrain federal actions. The trust responsibility has the capacity to protect
Indian resources against potentially adverse federal activity,' or to serve
as a guiding principle for federal agency action.9' In the future, the trust
responsibility should play a larger role as a guiding principle, one that not
only encourages federal agencies to better coordinate resource manage-
ment decisions which affect tribal interests, but also increases awareness
of tribal interests, and encourages tribal participation in natural resource
management.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Parravano decision requires that federal officials acknowledge
and protect tribal interests in furtherance of their federal trust responsibili-
ties.' Commerce Secretary Brown and Interior Secretary Babbitt took the
90. See Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property
Rights?, 17 PuB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 153, 171-73 (1996). Sanders notes that the trust re-
sponsibility imposes an obligation on the federal government to protect tribal interests which includes
a duty "to investigate potential adverse impacts on treaty-secured resources" and requires "strict com-
pliance with administrative policies [including] consultation with Indians." Id. at 172.
91. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471. Wood states:
Mhe trust doctrine is an important legal tool to protect native rights against adverse [feder-
al] agency action.... The trust responsibility remains a focal point for tribes in their ef-
forts to gain federal protection of native lands and resources.... Several agencies within
the executive branch are now developing trust policies to guide their actions affecting
tribes.
Id. at 1505-06. See also Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Towards
the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's
Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733 (1995) [hereinafter Executive's Trust Responsibility].
Wood states:
[Dieveloping trust policy in the form of guidance documents still achieves the overriding
goal of educating agency officials as to the nature of their trust responsibilities.... Even
when fashioned as guidance documents, trust policies should provide the necessary measure
of internal agency direction to prompt federal officials to fulfill their trust responsibility to
tribes.
Id. at 753.
92. See Wood, Executive's Trust Responsibility, supra note 91, at 760. Wood reviews the cur-
rent policies and practices of federal agencies whose actions affect tribes. Wood notes that the Clinton
administration offers "a promising step toward fulfilling the nation's trust obligation toward
tribes ... [but the] effort is deficient in several important respects." Id. Wood reviews the policies and
actions of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Energy, Justice, and the EPA, which have tremen-
dous impact on tribal resources and their management. Id. Though these agencies have issued broad
policy statements concerning their obligations to tribes, few have provided specific guidance on how
they plan to implement such policy. Id. Wood points to the EPA, which has taken an inclusive ap-
proach in its encouragement of the development of tribal environmental programs, as a "useful model
for gaining broad tribal involvement." Id.
93. Examples of cases in which courts have directed federal agencies to protect tribal interests
include United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (holding that the Creek Nation, a "depen-
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federal trust responsibility seriously and used it to guide their management
of the 1993 Klamath River salmon harvest. As a guiding principle, the
trust responsibility directs federal agencies to consider tribal interests
equally with other interests affected by agency action. The trust responsi-
bility played this role in Parravano. In the future, federal agencies should
use the trust responsibility as it was used by the Interior and Commerce
Secretaries in Parravano: as a guiding principle that recognizes and pro-
tects tribal interests in federal natural resource management policies.
dent Indian community under the guardianship of the United States," was entitled to just compensation
for lands erroneously surveyed by the U.S. General Land Office and improperly ceded to other tribes
and settlers); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (holding that the Secretary of
Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs violated treaties and their federal trust duties by continu-
ing to disburse funds to tribal officials known by the federal government to have misappropriated
tribal payments); United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the Secretary
of Interior, as trustee for Indian tribes, has the authority and an obligation to manage and conserve
tribal resources for the benefit of the Indians); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252
(D.D.C. 1973) (finding that the Secretary of Interior's fiduciary duty to tribes obligates the Secretary
to liberally construe a water allocation agreement in favor of the Paiute Tribe and to resolve conflict-
ing claims to water in a precise manner that would indicate the weight given to each interest in the
water).
